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In the event of an earthquake, one of the types of structures that is most susceptible to collapse is 
soft-story buildings (Association of Bay Area Governments [ABAG], 2016). Built before current 
regulation and codes were enacted, a soft-story residential building is a building that has 
commercial space or open parking on the first floor, with units built above it (ABAG, 2016). The 
first floor has a weak structure and the units above the first floor weigh heavily on it (Arroyo, 
2019). Due to their building structure, these properties may sway or collapse during an 
earthquake, ultimately causing fatalities and damage (ABAG, 2016). To prevent this from 
occurring, many cities have established programs to require property owners to retrofit their soft-
story buildings (ABAG, 2016). The timing and intensity of the next earthquake are 
unpredictable, but to prepare for the next event, the City of San Francisco has created the 
Mandatory Soft Story Program to retrofit the city’s soft-story buildings. The following research 
question guides this study: In San Francisco, what factors influence owners’ decisions to retrofit 





Loma Prieta Earthquake 
During the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, some soft-story buildings collapsed due to their 
design (Stark, 2019). The 6.9 magnitude earthquake resulted in 63 fatalities, 3,757 injuries, 
and considerable damage to many buildings (Collins, 2017). This violent earthquake 
caused particularly great damage to soft-story buildings in the Marina District, making it 
obvious how fragile these buildings with weak first stories were. The earthquake brought 
to light the vulnerability of wood-framed buildings, which initially had been viewed by 
engineers as earthquake-resistant and strong. It was quickly learned that wood-framed 
buildings can still collapse under certain circumstances (Pino & Enright, 2019). These 
wood light-frame structures collapsed, or came to the brink of collapse, because of their 
weak first stories. Some of the contributing factors responsible for the collapse of the 
larger wood-light frame buildings include a lack of bracing walls, liquefaction, and the use 
of obsolete materials. The majority of the damaged buildings had been built between the 
1890s and 1930s (Cobeen, Maffei, & Osteraas, 2019). For the past 30 years, urban 
planners have encouraged property owners to fix the soft-story building structures in case 
of another violent earthquake (Stark, 2019).   
Property owners and city governments in the Bay Area have spent $1.2 billion on 
retrofits since the Loma Prieta earthquake. Although there are better building codes now 
than there were in the past, there are still older buildings that do not meet the standards of 
the new building codes and are vulnerable to collapse. Some cities have identified the 
buildings that are at risk, but they are still having problems retrofitting them, with cost 
being the primary impediment. There are cities in the Bay Area that have not passed 
ordinances to require retrofits. For instance, San Jose has yet to create a list of homes that 
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are at risk, but the city has estimated that there are about 1,500 soft-story properties. 
Although the City of San Jose has not required the property owners to retrofit their 
buildings, officials are looking into cost-effective incentives that would motivate them to 
do so (Stark, 2019).  
Developing a Soft-Story Retrofit Policy 
Almost half of the houses that were damaged due to the Loma Prieta earthquake were soft-story 
buildings. Because soft-story buildings have been identified as a significant housing issue, some 
Bay Area jurisdictions “have already developed and adopted policies to take inventory, assess 
and retrofit these buildings” (ABAG, 2016, p. 6). To plan for a soft-story retrofit, there are five 
steps that a jurisdiction must follow. Figure 1 illustrates the steps that need to be taken to 
establish a soft-story retrofit program (ABAG, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Five Steps to Plan for a Soft-Story Retrofit Program 
 
Source: ABAG, 2016 
Soft story retrofit policies typically incur resistance from the general public and 
stakeholders because they affect private buildings and make building owners responsible for the 
costs. For such policies to garner political and public support, it is important that the first two 
steps—addressing the problem and building consensus—are completed carefully to address the 
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critical need for a soft-story retrofit, and to ensure cooperation from those involved on any 
potential problems. The third step, which is drafting a policy, requires clarifying the buildings 
that would be affected by the proposed retrofit policy, to list the buildings’ expected performance 
requirements after an earthquake, and to prioritize the order in which the buildings should be 
retrofitted. After the fourth step of adopting the policy comes the fifth step, which is 
implementing the program. During this step, jurisdictions are responsible for providing support 
to building owners, design professionals, and contractors to ensure that the program is being 
implemented as intended (ABAG, 2016). 
Potential Issues and Consideration 
There are some potential issues to consider in establishing a soft-story retrofit program. One of 
them is determining who incurs the costs of the retrofit: the building owner or the tenants. A 
retrofit program may attract more political support if the program is supportive of the building 
owners and determines ways to avoid burdening them with the whole cost. Building owners may 
argue that the cost of upgrading the buildings itself should be considered as an amenity to the 
tenants, to keep their buildings profitable. Therefore, financial assistance programs for building 
owners may be beneficial and lead to more support from elected officials and the public. 
However, if the costs of the retrofit are passed on to the tenants, tenants and tenant rights groups 
may resist these financial assistance programs for building owners. They may argue that ensuring 
safety should be expected, and that the burden of retrofitting the buildings should not be passed 
on to them. Low-income residents may feel a burden from an increase in rent, and may have to 
live in less safe areas or move out (ABAG, 2016). 
Financial programs that allow a tenant retrofit cost pass through are usually one of the 
major political challenges to passing a soft-story retrofit policy. As mentioned previously, there 
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is resistance on both sides when deciding who should be burdened with the costs. For example, 
in Los Angeles, the city council took more than a year to pass a cost-sharing policy for seismic 
retrofits. Furthermore, it would be difficult to pass a retrofit policy if rent control did not exist in 
the jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction decides how much of the cost can be passed through to the 
tenants, so it is advisable to include the local rent board in these discussions. In San Francisco, 
100% of the costs are allowed to be passed through to tenants so long as there is no more than a 
$30.00 or 10% increase to each tenant’s annual base rent (whichever is greater), while in Los 
Angeles, only 50% of the costs are allowed to be passed through to tenants, with no more than a 
$38 per month increase in rent per tenant (ABAG, 2016). 
In addition, a soft-story retrofit may affect the structure of the building’s ground story, as 
it may require bulky structures to be built. This may cause a reduction in the number of parking 
spots available during and after construction. Therefore, tenants should be provided details about 
their rights should they lose their parking spaces due to the soft-story retrofit. The building 
owners could be provided accommodations in zoning ordinances for parking requirements 
(ABAG, 2016). 
When buildings are subjected to a soft-story retrofit ordinance, the ordinance should 
clarify that owners are responsible for maintaining safe buildings in the event of a disaster. After 
an earthquake, those who have experienced injuries may blame building owners for being 
negligent in keeping their buildings up to code. Jurisdictions have the ability to impact owners’ 
liability in the wake of a future earthquake by identifying affected buildings and setting retrofit 




Phasing and Deadlines 
Many programs have established tiered systems that permit more time for the retrofitting of 
certain types of buildings than they do for others. Those buildings assigned to the highest priority 
level must be retrofitted more quickly than other buildings. In the case of San Francisco, the city 
government developed a tiered system that stipulated that buildings that had many occupants, or 
that housed high-risk populations, had to be retrofitted sooner than others. Thus, Tier 1 buildings 
are educational, assembly, or residential care facilities. Tier 2 buildings are buildings with 15 or 
more dwelling units. Tier 3 buildings are those buildings that do not fall within another tier. Tier 
4 buildings are those with the most recent compliance date, and that have ground-floor 
commercial use, or are in a liquefaction zone. Tier 4 building owners are given more time to 
retrofit their buildings due to the buildings’ more complex nature. Tenants may be displaced 
during the process of a Tier 4 retrofit, or the building may be in a liquefaction zone. 
Additionally, these tiers were established to prevent the city from receiving an overwhelming 
number of permit requests and plans at the same time (ABAG, 2016). 
San Francisco’s Mandatory Soft Story Program 
In 2013, San Francisco passed the Soft Story Seismic Retrofit Ordinance, which requires a 
mandatory seismic retrofit of wood-framed soft-story properties (Pino & Enright, 2019). 
This ordinance was created by Mayor Ed Lee and the city’s Earthquake Safety 
Implementation Program (ESIP) (San Francisco Department of Building Inspection 
[SFDBI], n.d.-a). ESIP is a 30-year plan that aims to improve San Francisco’s resilience 
and strength in the face of earthquakes (SFDBI, n.d.-a). Because soft-story buildings were 
identified as the city’s biggest risk, the Mandatory Seismic Retrofit Program was 
established (SFDBI, n.d.-a). The program mandated retrofits for multi-family and wood-
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framed buildings that are “three-stories or taller, or two-story buildings over a basement or 
crawl space, with five or more dwelling units” (Pino & Enright, 2019, para. 4) and whose 
permits are dated before January 1, 1978 (SFDBI, n.d.-e).  The Mandatory Soft Story 
Retrofit Program (MSSP) is led by the ESIP, while the San Francisco Department of 
Building Inspection (SFDBI) is responsible for enforcing compliance. Only the target story 
that is considered weak or soft needs to be retrofitted in the building. The target story is 
considered soft if it has a vastly different wall structure or number of walls in comparison 
to the stories above it (Pino & Enright, 2019). According to a 2016 report by the 
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), San Francisco has 6,700 soft-story 
buildings, the highest number of soft-story buildings in the region. The ultimate goal is to 
have 100% of the soft-story buildings retrofitted (Stark, 2019).  
 The ordinance provided a list of buildings categorized into four tiers: (1) Tier 1 
buildings are special, institutional, and educational buildings; (2) Tier 2 buildings are 
buildings with 15 or more units; (3) Tier 3 buildings are buildings with 5 to 14 units, and 
(4) Tier 4 buildings are buildings with ground-floor commercial spaces (Pino & Enright, 
2019). Table 1 shows each tier’s building owners’ deadlines for submitting permit 
applications and for completing the retrofitting of their buildings. 
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Table 1: Deadlines for Retrofitting Wood-Framed Buildings in Mandatory Seismic Retrofit 
Program 
 
Source: Pino & Enright, 2019 
Advertisement of the Mandatory Seismic Retrofit Program (Ordinance No. 66-13) 
The City of San Francisco conducted a community outreach campaign that included sending out 
repeated notices to the property owners of buildings that fit the requirements of the ordinance 
and using the media to spread the word (Pino & Enright, 2019). Property owners received 
notices starting in September 2013 and were required to send in their screening forms to the 
SFDBI by September 15, 2014.  
The city’s Office of Resilience and Recovery team created and held financing workshops, 
and yearly earthquake retrofit fairs. Government officials also worked with the SFDBI and the 
San Francisco Rent Board staff and experts on these projects to host public meetings. During 
these meetings, citizens were allowed to ask questions and raise concerns, and property owners 
were provided with education and information (Pino & Enright, 2019).  
Procedures for Property Owners 
The SFDBI mandated that each affected property owner turn in a screening application by 
September 15, 2014 (SFDBI, n.d.-c). Those who did not turn in this form were considered in 
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violation of the San Francisco Building Code (SFDBI, n.d.-c). After the screenings were 
completed, the property owners were assigned two tasks: (1) to obtain a construction permit and 
(2) to complete the retrofit work, with deadlines depending on the tier of building that they 
owned or managed (SFDBI, n.d.-c). These deadlines are ongoing. Prior to submitting their 
permit applications, property owners in each tier must collaborate with licensed design 
professionals to create plans and perform calculations (SFDBI, n.d.-c). After they have worked 
with the licensed design professionals, they must go to the SFDBI to submit their permit 
applications. Once these applications have been submitted, retrofit work is allowed to be 
performed (SFDBI, n.d.-c). During this stage, required inspections must be accounted for and the 
district inspector must be contacted (SFDBI, n.d.-c). All special inspections must be performed 
and signed off on before the final inspection is allowed to take place (SFDBI, n.d.-c). During the 
final inspection, when the building inspector has signed off on the job card, the property owner 
must request a certificate of final completion (CFC; SFDBI, n.d.-c). The CFC is a document that 
declares that a building is safe and sound for people to occupy (SFDBI, n.d.-d). The building 
owner has to send the CFC to the MSSP via email or take it to Window #8 on the first floor of 
1660 Mission Street in San Francisco (SFDBI, n.d.-g). The CFC confirms that they are in 
compliance with the MSSP (SFDBI, n.d.-g). Figure 2 details the steps that property owners must 
take, as described above. 
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Figure 2: Workflow of Procedures for Property Owners 
 
Source: SFDBI, n.d.-g 
Financing the Retrofit 
The estimated cost to retrofit a building, depending on its size, hazard level, and needed seismic 
retrofit work, is between $60,000 and $200,000 (Hui, 2017). The City of San Francisco has made 
public financing available to building owners through the Alliance NRG/Counterpointe 
Sustainable Real Estate Program. The NRG financing program provides business owners with a 
loan that covers 100% of the retrofit costs, and the costs are permitted to be passed on to tenants 
for rent-controlled properties (Pino & Enright, 2019). The majority of buildings in San Francisco 
are rent-controlled (Pino & Enright, 2019). The benefits of retrofitting the buildings include 
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increased protection for tenants and properties (Collins, 2017). Thus, the San Francisco Rent 
Board allows 100% of costs of the seismic work required by law to be passed through to the 
tenants, so long as there is no more than a 10% increase to each tenant’s annual rent (San 
Francisco Rent Board, n.d.). If the cost of the passthrough exceeds the 10% increase, the rest of 
the cost of the passthrough can be added to the rent the following year(s) (Collins, 2017). 
However, tenants who are facing financial hardship have the option to submit a hardship appeal 
application for passthroughs (SFDBI, n.d.-b). If the property owner decides to pay for the costs 
of the retrofit or seek a loan from a bank, they face restrictions on the kinds of costs that can be 
transferred to the tenants (Pino & Enright, 2019). 
Notices of Violation 
To enforce and advertise compliance, placards were posted and notices of violation (NOVs) were 
sent to building owners who were non-compliant with the MSSP (SFDBI, n.d.-f). These 
placards, which featured the words “Earthquake Warning!” in big, bold and red letters, warned 
residents, property owners, and the public that the property owner(s) were not in compliance 
with the Mandatory Soft Story Retrofit Program (Pino & Enright, 2019). Those who were 
considered in violation were those property owners who had unsuccessfully completed the 
screening process, who had not completed the retrofit of their buildings in accordance with the 
compliance tier timeline dates, or who had not applied for a permit by the deadline (SFDBI, n.d.-
f). If the property owners failed to resolve their NOVs, they were required to attend a director’s 
hearing to explain the reasons for non-compliance (SFDBI, n.d.-f). Additional costs were also 
applied to the property, including the cost of the time that inspectors spent urging the property 




Soft-Story Ordinance in Los Angeles 
In December 2014, the City of Los Angeles established the Resilience by Design initiative 
to strengthen the city’s built environment against earthquake vulnerabilities, as well as to 
protect the economy and lives of citizens by preparing the city to recover efficiently from 
future earthquakes. In response to this initiative, Ordinance No. 183983 was signed into 
law in October 2015; it was amended in January 2016, creating Ordinance No. 184081. 
Ordinance No. 183983 and Ordinance No. 184081 require buildings with soft, weak, and 
open-front wall lines and building permits issued before 1978 to be retrofitted. According 
to the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, there are about 13,500 affected 
buildings in total. The property owners are responsible for the costs of the retrofit, but if 
the retrofit is completed by the specified timeline, they can apply for the city’s Seismic 
Retrofit Program (Kang, Yi, & Burton, 2019). The Seismic Retrofit Work Cost Recovery 
Program allows the property owners to temporarily increase the rent equally among all 
rental units so they can recover up to 50% of the retrofit cost (Los Angeles Housing 
Community Investment Department, n.d.).  
Kang et al. (2019) explored the post-earthquake recovery-related benefits of the 
city’s soft-story ordinance in five particular neighborhoods: Koreatown, Westlake, Pico 
Union, Lomita, and East Hollywood. There are about 8,000 soft-story buildings in these 
five neighborhoods. Kang et al. (2019) found that the ordinance would reduce the initial 
post-earthquake mean loss of occupancy by about 25%. However, if the considered 
recovery performance metric were set to restoring 90% occupancy, there would be a 64% 
reduction as a result of the ordinance retrofit. The researchers came to these numbers by 
completing a scenario-based damage assessment and using a specific model to illustrate 
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post-earthquake recovery. Another particular area of study was the effect of the city’s 
ordinance on post-earthquake recovery trajectories. In comparison to the other four 
neighborhoods, Koreatown had the highest percentage of soft, weak, and open-front 
buildings at 28%. Kang et al. (2019) also found that the retrofit was projected to “reduce 
the initial loss of occupancy in Koreatown by 45% compared to 25% when considering all 
neighborhoods” (p. 181). The soft-story ordinance in Los Angeles is expected to have a 
significant impact on the loss of occupancy after an earthquake. 
Berkeley’s Soft-Story Retrofits 
When the 1996 Northridge earthquake occurred in the Los Angeles area, the soft first story of the 
Northridge Meadows apartment building failed and killed 16 people who resided in first-floor 
apartments while they slept. This caused California cities to inventory their soft first-story 
buildings to understand the community’s risk from such structures (Comerio, 1998). The ground 
level of a building is much weaker and more flexible than other levels, putting it at greater risk of 
collapse (Lindt et al., 2014). Samant et al. (2009) stated that in the event of a large earthquake, 
the ground-level walls of soft-story buildings would be unable to support the stories above the 
ground floors of the buildings. The ground-level walls would sway back and forth or shift 
sideways, potentially resulting in building collapse, with the ground floors demolished. 
Although many residential buildings are built using a woodframe construction, the partial 
or entire first stories of such buildings are oftentimes used for parking. The first story of such a 
building accordingly has fewer walls and partitions in comparison to the stories above. In some 
areas of California, such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, two- to five-story wood-framed 
buildings are typically used for multifamily dwellings. The upper stories are occupied by 
residents (Burton, Rad, Yi, Gutierrez, & Ojuri, 2019). Among those that inventoried their 
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building stock, the City of Berkeley discovered that there were 321 wood-framed soft-story 
buildings that contained over 3,200 housing units. As a result, in 2005, the city established an 
ordinance that mandated that owners of soft-story buildings identify the weaknesses in the 
buildings and propose possible solutions. They were required to post signs to alert tenants that 
the buildings were seismically at risk. Signed into law on January 4, 2014, a new ordinance 
required the rest of the soft-story buildings to be retrofitted, and included wood-framed buildings 
built before 1978 (City of Berkeley, n.d.). By the end of 2016, owners of these soft-story 
buildings were required to apply for building permits and were given two years to complete the 
retrofits. As of October 2, 2015, there were 124 buildings that had yet to be retrofitted.  
Public Policy and Mitigating Earthquake Risks 
Based on a nine-year, $1 million-dollar study conducted by the Community Action Plan for 
Seismic Safety (CAPSS), “43 to 80 percent of multi-story wood frame buildings in San 
Francisco will be deemed unsafe after a magnitude 7.2 earthquake” (Lindt et al., 2014). Comerio 
(2004) reviewed data collected from a variety of large earthquakes and stated that building 
damage is the primary type of damage that occurs. Soft-story buildings are one of the biggest 
threats to a city in the event of an earthquake (Porter & Cobeen, 2012). Earthquakes can be 
viewed as a housing disaster, since they not only damage homes but also require victims to be 
rehoused and require building owners to shoulder the costs of repairing and rebuilding the 
buildings. The Loma Prieta earthquake heavily affected single-room occupancy hotels in San 
Francisco, Oakland, and Santa Cruz and caused residents to become homeless (Comerio, 2004). 
In response, the SFDBI established CAPSS to develop a plan to decrease the risk of earthquakes 
in the city (Porter & Cobeen, 2012). CAPSS also developed repair plans and guidelines that 
would help with recovery after an earthquake (Samant et al., 2009). Participants in CAPSS 
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argued that seismic risk was a community issue that was far more significant than the individual 
concerns of building owners who may have the retrofit costs imposed on them. The CAPSS 
advisory committee met numerous times and came to the consensus that there was a need for an 
ordinance requiring the retrofit of high-occupancy, soft-story wood-framed buildings (Porter & 
Cobeen, 2012). 
 Moreover, building owners were oftentimes uninsured, so the public was left to manage 
the housing crisis. An example of the government implementing policies in order to mitigate 
potential losses in the aftermath of disasters is when California funded the retrofit of state-owned 
buildings that had poor seismic structures. This type of policy/program aimed to protect a portion 
of the public building stock, but it was difficult to encourage owners of private buildings to 
explore implementing similar pre-earthquake mitigation efforts (Comerio, 2004). 
According to Comerio (2004), one of the basic policy approaches to reduce the 
impact of disasters and encourage safe development is implementing policies that include 
preparedness information, building codes, and insurance. It is obvious that establishing 
building codes prevents potential damage from earthquakes and other natural disasters, but 
building codes are generally focused on new buildings. In fact, the high rate of deaths from 
earthquakes is generally due to a lack of enforcement of building regulations. In the United 
States, building codes and practices differ between urban and rural areas and among states.  
In fact, CAPSS conducted a study to analyze the potential consequences for multi-unit, 
soft-story wood-framed dwellings in the event of several moderate to large earthquakes. If 
several moderate to large earthquakes were to occur, an estimated tens of thousands of people 
who live in these affected homes would be displaced. A mandatory retrofit would significantly 
decrease this risk (Samant et al., 2009).  
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Many states provide information on how to make buildings more disaster-resistant but do 
not make it mandatory for owners to perform the upgrades. Oftentimes, it can be difficult to 
compel owners to provide these basic safety measures. For instance, after Hurricane Andrew, 
Florida attempted to enforce a state-wide building code, but rural jurisdictions opposed it. As a 
result, Florida developed a state building code that brought codes to areas that did not have any, 
while having the unintended consequence of weakening the hurricane safety requirements in 
other areas that already had codes. The City of Berkeley has been successful in enforcing 
earthquake mitigation for public and private buildings. The government offered homeowners an 
incentive, indicating that if the homeowners performed structural retrofitting of their houses, the 
city would offer them a real estate transfer tax rebate. Due to this incentive, 38% of houses in 
Berkeley have been seismically retrofitted.  Berkeley was also successful in adding seismic 
improvements to its city hall (Comerio, 2004).  
In addition, because of past experiences with a lack of availability of commercial 
hazard insurance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has encouraged 
local governments to make buildings and infrastructure disaster-resistant, thus helping to 
avoid damage that may necessitate insurance payouts. Since bridges and buildings that 
have been retrofitted have suffered less damage from disasters than they would have 
without the retrofitting, it is apparent that encouraging earthquake and hazard mitigation 
improvements would result in lower federal and personal recovery costs from future 
events. Although it has been proven that mitigation efforts can prevent further losses, the 
real estate market does not provide incentives for building owners to complete seismic 
retrofits, such as allowing them to collect increased rent or increasing the value of their 
building (Comerio, 2000).  
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Comerio (2004) stated that the ABAG conducted a study in 1999 that found that Berkeley 
residents’ high income and education levels combined with the local government’s outreach and 
information campaign efforts could have played a role in the city’s success in earthquake 
mitigation. Governments should create initiatives and policies with incentives such as tax credits 
and established relationships with lenders to associate disaster mitigation with beneficial loan 
rates. Lindt et al. (2014) suggested that a policy that accommodates residents and building 
owners fosters public support, and such support hastens the implementation of the policy. 
Additionally, Comerio (2004) mentioned that successful mitigation policies are those that are not 
restrictive and that explore ideas for how individuals, businesses, and public institutions can 
establish basic safety requirements for buildings. If cities do not allow building owners to 
increase rent, the cities struggle to mandate property owners to seismically retrofit their 
properties due to the expensive costs. Thus, enforcing mitigation is difficult without providing 
incentives (Comerio, 2000). Liou and Kapucu (2014) determined that effective disaster recovery 
programs require a stronger framework for accountability. Their research showed “the weakness 
of general policies and guidelines and the need for specific standards to assure the quality in 






The research is based on a program evaluation of the San Francisco MSSP. According to Sylvia 
and Sylvia (2012), a program evaluation is conducted to determine whether a given program is 
achieving its goal: in this case, of ensuring that the identified buildings are retrofitted. A survey 
was distributed to owners of Tier 2 and Tier 3 residential buildings. Only those building owners 
who had received CFCs were contacted, since they had already completed all necessary work 
related to retrofitting their building. Building owners from Tier 4 were not contacted because 
their CFCs are not due until September 15, 2020. 
The program evaluation methodology has four phases: problem identification, solution 
development, implementation, and feedback evaluation.  






      Implementation Feedback Evaluation 
Soft-story buildings 
are San Francisco’s 
greatest risk when it 
comes to determining 
the city’s overall 
resilience to 









that are identified as 
soft story. 
Affected buildings in 
Tiers 1–4 are legally 
required to be retrofitted 
and have CFCs by 
September 15, 2020. 
Notices of violation are 
given to those building 
owners who are non-
compliant. 
Evaluate public data and 
survey results. Analyze 
the feedback to answer the 
question, “What factors 
influence owners’ 
decisions to retrofit their 
buildings?” 
 
A mixed-methods analysis was performed by drawing on the survey results and 
extracting public data regarding the identified properties’ statuses. For the first step, public data 
on existing soft-story buildings in San Francisco (Data SF, n.d.) was analyzed to compile 
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statistical information on the properties that have been retrofitted. The researcher used data from 
the week of April 4, 2020. Part I of this study involved analyzing quantitative data extracted 
from the city’s public data. The researcher counted how many Tier 2 and Tier 3 building retrofits 
have been completed and were issued CFCs, and compared the number to the retrofit rate. In 
addition, the average median income of each of the supervisorial districts of the target buildings 
was identified, and the retrofit rates of the districts were compared.  
Part II of this study involved analyzing qualitative data from the survey results. For the 
second step, in order to find out the common factors that motivated the building owners’ 
decisions to retrofit, a survey was created. The distribution of responses to the survey indicates 
common factors that may have played a role in owners’ decisions to retrofit. Finally, the 
researcher identified the common factors that are correlated with the highest retrofit rate; this 
information is useful for other current or future soft story programs to consider. The researcher 
investigated how to improve retrofit programs for other cities, using San Francisco as a model 
for finding out which factors influence building owners’ decisions about whether to retrofit. 
Data 
The researcher researched each of the 2,963 Tier 2 and Tier 3 properties that had been retrofitted 
to find the property owner’s or property manager’s contact information, whether their phone 
number or email address. If the property owner’s contact information was not available, the 
researcher attempted to identify the property manager’s contact information. The survey data 
was collected through phone calls, emails, and Qualtrics, an online survey tool. If the researcher 
was only able to find an owner’s or manager’s phone number, the researcher called them. Each 
time the researcher called an identified phone number, the researcher asked to speak to the 
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building owner or property manager, introduced herself, explained the research and the 
commitment to confidentiality, and requested the person’s consent to ask the survey questions. 
 If the researcher only found their email address, the researcher sent them an email. If the 
researcher found both their phone number and email address, the researcher attempted to contact 
them using both methods. The email invited the owner or manager to respond to the survey by 
directly emailing the researcher back, setting up a phone call, or filling out the survey with the 
Qualtrics link that was provided in the email. The email also contained an introduction, 
explanation of the research, and a statement of confidentiality, and asked for consent to proceed 
with the survey. Upon receiving consent, the researcher proceeded with the questions. The 
survey asked the following questions: 
1.    In 2013, Mayor Ed Lee signed legislation that requires all of San Francisco’s “multi-
unit soft-story buildings” to be retrofitted. In addition to the legal requirement, what was 
the most important reason to retrofit your building? 
a.    To maintain and protect the housing stock 
b.    To enhance and increase the property’s value 
c.    The ability to pass through 100% of the cost of seismic retrofit work to the 
tenants 
d.    Other. Please explain: 
_________________________________________________ 
2.    Is the building rent controlled? 
a.    Yes 
b.    No 
c.    Decline to state 
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3.    What is the monthly average unit rent price? 
a.    $0-$1000 
b.    $1000-$2000 
c.    $2000-$3000 
d.    More than $3000 
4.    What is your length of ownership? 
a.    Under 5 years 
b.    Over 5 years 
5.    Is the building renter occupied or owner occupied? 
a.    All renters 
b.   Owner and renters 
c.    Decline to state 
Of the 2,963 Tier 2 and Tier 3 properties that were retrofitted and issued CFCs, 678 had contact 
information available to the researcher. Of the 678 property owners and managers contacted, 101 
filled out the survey, which is about a 15% response rate. Thirty-four responded by phone, 45 





This section presents the results of the research, including the quantitative data (number of 
properties retrofitted and the retrofit rate per district) and the response breakdown for each 
question in the survey. Public information was obtained from the city’s website. Although the 
public data is updated weekly, the research is based on the public data updated on April 4, 2020.  
To shed light on common factors that influence owners’ decisions to retrofit, the results include 
qualitative data from the survey. The participants were informed that the survey was voluntary 
and that no information directly tied to them would be shared. The participants were able to opt 
out of any question that they did not want to answer. The survey was administered from June to 
September, 2020. Responses were collected via phone, email, and Qualtrics. 
The San Francisco MSSP has four tiers. Tier 1 includes “any building containing 
educational, assembly, or residential care facility uses (Building Code Occupancy E, A, R2.1, 
R3.1, or R4),” Tier 2 includes buildings that have 15 or more units, Tier 3 includes buildings that 
do not fall in any of the other tiers, and Tier 4 includes “any building containing ground floor 
commercial uses (Building Code Occupancy B or M), or any building in a mapped liquefaction 
zone” (SFDBI, n.d.-c, para.4). The reported data includes only residential buildings, which are 
Tier 2 and Tier 3 buildings. Tier 1 is not residential, so it was excluded from the data. Because 
Tier 4’s deadline for the completion of work and issuance of CFCs was September 15, 2020; 
these buildings were thus excluded from the data.  
Number of Properties Retrofitted 
Table 3 shows the number of properties whose retrofit work is complete and that were issued 
CFCs, as well as the retrofit rate of each tier. This table reveals that 83.69% of the total number 
of Tier 2 properties requiring retrofitting have had the work completed and have had CFCs 
issued, while 74.84% of the total number of Tier 3 properties requiring retrofitting have had the 
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work completed and have had CFCs issued. Tier 2 has a higher retrofit rate, but it did not have as 
many properties that needed to be retrofitted as Tier 3 did. 
Table 3: Buildings for Which Work Has Been Completed and CFCs Have Been Issued 
Tiers 
Number of 
Properties That had 
Work Completed & 
CFC Issued 
Total Number of 
Properties that Needed 
to be Retrofitted 
% Completed, CFC 
Issued  
2 431 515 83.69% 
3 2,532 3,383 74.84% 
Source: Data SF, n.d. 
Median Household Income by Supervisorial District 
Table 4 shows the median household income for each of the 11 supervisorial districts in San 
Francisco. District 6 has the lowest median household income at $37,431, while District 2 has 
the highest median household income at $105,509. 
Table 4: 2010 Median Household Income by Supervisorial District 
 
Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst, 2013, as cited in U.S. Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey 2006–2010 & Census 2010 
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Retrofit Rate by District 
Table 5 shows that the lowest retrofit rate (54.17%) was found in District 6. As shown in Table 
4, District 6 also has the lowest median household income ($37,431). District 2 has the highest 
median household income ($105,509), and it has the third-highest retrofit rate (79.74%). The 
highest retrofit rate (81.08%) was found in District 4, where the median household income 
($77,376) is the fourth-highest. The citywide median household income is $71,416, and the 
citywide retrofit rate (Tier 2 and Tier 3) is 75.99%.  
 
Table 5: Total Retrofit Rate of Each District (Tiers 1 and 4 Excluded) 
Supervisorial District 
Number of 
Properties That had 
Work Completed & 
CFC Issued 
Total Number of 
Properties that 
Needed to be 
Retrofitted 
% Completed, CFC 
Issued  
1 410 513 79.92% 
2 622 780 79.74% 
3 433 573 75.57% 
4 90 111 81.08% 
5 610 817 74.66% 
6 26 48 54.17% 
7 36 51 70.59% 
8 541 712 75.98% 
9 139 208 66.83% 
10 43 66 65.15% 
11 13 20 65.00% 
Total 2963 3899 75.99% 






Question 1: In 2013, Mayor Ed Lee signed legislation that requires all of San Francisco’s 
“multi-unit soft-story buildings” to be retrofitted. In addition to the legal requirement, what was 
the most important reason to retrofit your building?  
This question asked participants to disclose the main reason they had retrofitted their buildings, 
apart from it being required. Responses to the question revealed that 32% of participants chose to 
retrofit their buildings to maintain and protect the housing stock, 14% of participants chose to 
retrofit their buildings to enhance and increase their property value, and 5% of participants chose 
to retrofit their buildings due to the ability to pass through 100% of the costs of the seismic 
retrofit work to the tenants. The most common answer participants gave when asked about the 
most important reason why they retrofitted their building was “Other” (49%). The least common 
answer was the 100% passthrough (5%). One participant was unable to pick just one choice, so 
his answer is not included in the count. 




  Question #1              %  Count 
A To maintain and protect the housing stock    32.00% 32 
B To enhance and increase the property’s value  14.00% 14 
C 
The ability to pass through 100% of the 
cost of seismic retrofit work to the 
tenants   5.00% 5 
D Other. Please explain:   49.00% 49 
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The following are the 11 highlighted responses under “Other”: 
• “Monetary value, insurance reduced” (Participant #2, phone communication) 
• “All of the above” (Participant #3, email communication) 
• “No other reason other than the legal requirement” (Participant #4, email communication) 
• “Protect rent controlled tenants” (Participant #12, email communication) 
• “So people don’t die in the building during an earthquake” (Participant #10, email 
communication) 
•  “To save lives” (Participant #28, phone communication) 
• “Only did it because of the legal requirement” (Participant #29, phone communication) 
• “Safety” (Participant #67, Qualtrics) 
• “Ability to add accessory dwelling units” (Participant #87, email communication) 
• “To meet with legal requirement” (Participant #97, email communication) 
• “Enhance the structural integrity of the building” (Participant #101, Qualtrics) 
Question 2: Is the building rent controlled?  
This question reveals that 93% of the participants owned or managed buildings that were rent-
controlled and 7% of participants did not. This data shows that the vast majority (93%) of the 
buildings that have been retrofitted and issued CFCs in the San Francisco MSSP are rent-
controlled. One participant did not answer the question because the answers available did not suit 






Table 7: Question 2 Response Breakdown 
  Question #2                 %   Count 
A Yes   93% 93 
B No   7% 7 
C Decline to state   0% 0 
 
Question 3: What is the monthly average unit rent price?  
This question reveals that 1.23% of the participants collect an average of $0–$1,000 in rent per 
unit per month, 13.58% of the participants collect an average of $1,000–$2,000 in rent per unit 
per month, 71.60% of the participants collect an average of $2,000–$3,000 in rent per unit per 
month, and 13.58% of the participants collect an average of more than $3,000 in rent per unit per 
month. The majority of participants indicated that they have properties whose monthly average 
unit rent is $2,000–$3,000. 
One participant did not answer because the answers available did not suit the participant. 
Four participants opted out of the question. Fifteen participants were not included in the count 
because they stated that their rent amounts vary. 
Table 8:  Question 3 Response Breakdown 
  Question #3                %   Count 
A $0-$1000   1.23% 1 
B $1000-$2000   13.58% 11 
C $2000-$3000   71.60% 58 





Question 4: What is your length of ownership?  
This question reveals that 8.08% of the participants have been owners for fewer than five years 
and 91.92% of participants have been owners for more than five years. One participant opted out 
of the question, and one participant was not included in the count because the answers available 
did not suit the participant. 
Table 9:  Question 4 Response Breakdown 
  Question #4               %  Count 
A Under 5 years   8.08% 8 
B Over 5 years   91.92% 91 
 
Question 5: Is the building renter-occupied or owner-occupied? 
This question reveals that 92% of properties are occupied exclusively by renters and 8% of 
properties are occupied by owners and renters. One participant was not included in the count 
because the answers available did not suit the participant. 
Table 10:  Question 5 Response Breakdown 
  Question #5              %  Count 
A All renters   92.00% 92 
B Owners and renters   8.00% 8 
C Decline to state   0% 0 
 
Participant Comments 
Some participants provided unprompted thoughts about and reviews of the program. The major 
trends in comments, along with the value and size of the properties belonging to the participants 
who made the comments, are described in this section. The value and size of the properties were 




Those who had positive feedback on the San Francisco MSSP managed or owned 
buildings that had property values ranging from approximately $2.6 million to $5.8 million 
dollars. Those who had negative feedback managed or owned buildings that had property values 
ranging from approximately $1.9 million to $3.7 million dollars. There were three properties that 
were not included in this breakdown because there was not enough data to generate an accurate 
estimate and one property that could not be found on Redfin. 
Those who had positive feedback managed or owned buildings with property sizes 
ranging from 4,837 square feet to 9,684 square feet. Those who had negative feedback managed 
or owned buildings with property sizes ranging from 3,200 square feet to 22,624 square feet. 
Pros and Cons of San Francisco MSSP 
Table 11 was created based on the comments that the participants provided to explain why they 
chose “Other” for Question 1, as well as the additional comments listed in Table 12, showing the 
general pros and cons of the San Francisco MSSP. 
Table 11 shows participants’ additional comments along with the property sizes and 
property values of the respective participants’ buildings. 









"SF required me to be retrofitted by 
a certain date, but when I had it all 
ready, the city told me they weren't 




"There were other measures that the 
city could have done. It was very 
costly, and even with the program, 
we wouldn't recoup all of the costs. 
When we asked why the lawmakers 
signed this law, they didn't have the 
answers. The retrofit was very 
costly, about $300,000 for a $2,294,502  




building that didn't really need to be 
retrofitted and for a building wasn't 
of any use anymore" 
#19 Phone 
"It was a good idea to retrofit and to 




"I retrofitted my other property that 




"It was very expensive, didn't make 
money off of it and because the 
building is rent controlled, I didn't 
receive much so can't make up for 
the cost of the repairs. I didn't think 














"It was a wise decision to retrofit in 
case there is any earthquake hazard. 
I also own two other buildings that 
have already been retrofitted before 









"I am hesitant to respond as I do not 
consider this to be a "Success" 
when you hold owners hostage to 
force exorbitant repairs, many 
property owners had to sell their 
buildings because with rent 
controlled rents, they simply could 
not afford the repair.   
In answer to your question number 
1.  The only reason we did the 
retrofit was because we were forced 
to.  Not like we had a choice. This 
set back my property owner $300K. 
It took a year to refinance the 
building as my property owners are 
retired so it was hard to get the 
financing.  The city said they would 
provide financing which was a joke 
and did not exist.  The only win is 
we can go back and get 100% in 
pass through, however since tenants 





see any of the pass through, 
especially now with COVID" 
#86 Phone 
"The retrofit was necessary to 
maintain the structure of the 
building, especially for buildings 
built in early 1990s for tenant 
safety. If an earthquake happens, 
you will run into major issues if you 




"The program is great, and I did 
seismic work in other buildings 
where it was not required. It is a 
great investment and it's not about 
if an earthquake will happen, but 










"It was a wise choice to protect 
ourselves, to protect tenants and to 




"The ONLY reason the vast 
majority of building owners would 
do a soft story retrofit on a building 
is to meet the regulatory 
requirements of the city". The 
participant made comments about 
each of the answer choices in 
question #1. The comment the 
participant made to choice A is 
"How one protects their investment 
is unique to the property owner, and 
the situation.  San Francisco has 
been on an earthquake fault since 
the founding of the city.  The 
majority of the buildings survived 
1989 with no issue.  Even more if 
you eliminate those on liquefaction 
zones". The comment made towards 
Choice B was "I don’t believe this 
is a viable reason.  Other than 
removing the regulatory risk of a 
purchase, there is minimal 
appreciated value to a soft story 
retrofit building.  Because of the 
regulation requirement, it removes 
that requirement, without the 







much difference.  Similar to how 
most upgrades do not change the 
value of a house by any amount 
close to the cost of doing them 
unless they are highly desirable or 
cosmetic". The comment towards 
choice C is "This is also a poor 
reason.  The 100% pass through is 
over 20 years and does not include 
items like impact costs (if you had 
to remove temporarily services like 
parking or storage).  Furthermore, 
tenants have the ability to claim 
economic hardship and completely 
negate the passthrough.  If tenants 
move out, the passthrough goes 
away.  If rents fall, pass throughs 
are meaningless (current situation).  
If a tenant is at, or near, market 
rent, you would not administer the 
pass through and risk losing the 
tenant.  Ultimately, the passthrough 
is a very poor argument". The 
participant stated they chose D "to 
meet with legal requirement" 
#99 Email 
"State Senator Scott Weiner should 
be commended for pushing through 
legislation for the ADU’s- 
additional dwelling units. These 
units helped soften the financial 
blow to owners and increased 












Table 12 shows the overall themes of the pros and cons that were provided in the survey. 
Table 12:  Overall Pros and Cons of San Francisco MSSP 
PROS CONS 
 
Protects tenants Cannot recoup the costs 
Prevent earthquake damage Not needed 
Protects investment in building Too expensive 
Overall safety Forced owners to retrofit 
Ability to add accessory dwelling units  Difficult to get financing 
Maintain structure of the building 100% passthrough is over 20 years 
  











The main objective of this study was to identify common factors that influence owners’ decisions 
to retrofit their buildings and analyze common answers. The majority of Tier 2 and Tier 3 
buildings that were required to undergo retrofitting and receive CFCs were retrofitted by the set 
deadlines, as shown in Table 3. 
Comparing Districts and Retrofit Rates 
Table 13 shows that the lowest median household income corresponds to the lowest retrofit rate. 
As the median household income increases, the retrofit rate generally increases with some 
fluctuations. At a median household income level of $74,668 or higher, the retrofit rate is 
between 70% to 81%. The 50% and 60% retrofit rates largely correspond to median household 
incomes between $37,431 to $71,504, with the exception of two districts that have retrofit rates 
in the 70th percentile. In general, the higher the median household income in the district, the 
higher the retrofit rate in that district. 
Table 13: Median Household Income and Retrofit Rate Comparison 
Median Household 
Income (from lowest to 
highest) 
Supervisorial District Retrofit Rate 
$37,431 6 54.17% 
$43,513 3 75.57% 
$55,487 10 65.15% 
$67,331 5 74.66% 
$67,989 9 66.83% 
$71,504 11 65.00% 
$74,668 1 79.92% 
$77,376 4 81.08% 
$94,121 7 70.59% 
$95,930 8 75.98% 




Question 1. The majority of participants chose “Other” as the main reason why they retrofitted 
their buildings. As shown in the highlighted comments that property managers and owners 
provided on the survey regarding the San Francisco MSSP, many retrofitted because they wanted 
to protect their tenants and the buildings, while others did it only to meet the legal requirement. 
Table 11 further illustrates why the San Francisco MSSP was an issue for many and may explain 
why only 5% chose “The ability to pass through 100% of the cost of seismic retrofit work to the 
tenants” as their answer. Recouping costs is a lengthy process. According to Collins (2017), 
building owners have to pay the costs out of their own pockets and then must increase tenants’ 
rent over a period of 20 years to recoup the expenses. Because tenants can claim economic 
hardship and can apply for an appeal of the rent increase, this may be a major concern, especially 
during the current coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which is causing economic hardship for 
many due to shelter-in-place orders and business closures. The long-term impact of COVID is 
unknown. Moreover, the stipulation that the passthrough cannot result in an increase of more 
than 10% of the tenant’s base rent a year (ABAG, 2016) may be a disincentive for building 
owners from retrofitting or implementing the 100% passthrough. The length of the passthrough 
and the maximum percentage increase of 10% of rent a year may be an explanation for why “The 
ability to pass through 100% of the cost of seismic retrofit work to tenants” was the least 
frequently chosen answer. Property owners who do not choose to go through with the 100% 
passthrough have to cover the costs of the retrofit themselves. Finally, “To maintain and protect 
the housing stock” was the second most frequently chosen answer and seems to be an incentive 
for property owners to undertake the retrofit. 
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Question 2.  A common factor among those who retrofitted their buildings was that their 
buildings were rent controlled. However, rent control may complicate paying for the retrofits 
because the property owners are limited to a particular percentage increase in rent. 
Question 3. The majority of those who retrofitted their buildings and were in compliance had an 
average monthly unit rent between $2,000 and $3,000. The relatively high rental rates may be 
particularly beneficial for those who choose to do the 100% passthrough, as they can increase 
each tenant’s cost no more than 10% and may recoup the costs faster than those who have 
monthly average unit rental rates of less than $1,000. In addition, those who have higher monthly 
average unit rent prices may profit more from their properties than those who have the majority 
of their tenants paying less in rent. With the current market rate and economy, some property 
owners may be making little to no money from their buildings, depending on their average unit 
rent price. 
Question 4. Another common factor among those who retrofitted their buildings was that their 
individual length of ownership was more than five years. Those who have owned rental 
properties for that long may have bought the properties as long-term investments. Therefore, 
retrofitting the buildings may protect their investments in the case of a disastrous earthquake.  
Question 5. A common factor among the majority of those who retrofitted their properties was 
that the properties were occupied by all renters. Those who chose to retrofit may have done so to 
protect the tenants and avoid having placards placed on their buildings warning the tenants and 
public that the owners or managers are not in compliance with the program. Non-compliance 





 A limitation to the study was the amount of data collected. The sample size of the survey 
was only 101 owners and managers. Although there were 2,963 properties that were retrofitted in 
Tier 2 and Tier 3, only 678 properties out of the entire retrofitted property list had contact 
information available online. Some property owners and managers whose contact information 
was available online were unable to be contacted, as some of the published phone numbers were 
disconnected. These owners and managers were not considered for the survey. A larger sample 
size is necessary to provide a more accurate representation of program compliance and common 
factors, which would be easier to achieve if the contact information for each of the properties 
was easily accessible. 
Second, the number of responses for each question was not equal, as some chose to opt 
out of answering or the answers did not suit them. The response rate for each question varied. 
Third, there may be bias in the survey results. Those who are small landlords may have a 
harder time affording the retrofit costs than big businesses or bigger landlords. Therefore, those 
small landlords, also known as “mom and pop” landlords, may be more inclined to view their 
experiences as negative, because they did not think the risk justified the cost. On the other hand, 
some of those who indicated that they had had positive experiences may have been able to afford 
the cost of the retrofit and thus were likely to view their experiences more positively than those 
who could not afford it. 
Lastly, participants were not randomly selected. Only those owners and managers for 
whom the researcher was able to find contact information were contacted. The findings thus 
cannot be generalized to the entire population of those who retrofitted their buildings in Tier 2 
and Tier 3. In addition, Tier 1 and Tier 4 were not included, meaning that the findings only 
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represent two tiers. This is not enough information to form a true representation of all the 






The San Francisco MSSP was designed to protect the housing stock and increase the strength 
and resilience of local buildings to ensure the safety of tenants. This research study helped to 
identify the common factors influencing decisions among property owners and managers who 
retrofitted their buildings. The findings reveal a number of benefits to the San Francisco MSSP, 
such as the ability to protect tenants, add accessory dwelling units, and protect owners and 
managers’ investments in their buildings. In retrospect, there are a number of concerns as well, 
including the difficulty of the 100% passthrough and the high costs of retrofitting. While the 
program seems to be beneficial for tenants, and to be designed to prevent damage from future 
earthquakes, the current parameters of and assistance offered by the program are not perceived 
by property owners to be helpful to them when they are forced to make these repairs. 
Areas for Future Research 
This research project focuses on the City of San Francisco. Further research could be done to 
compare San Francisco to Oakland and Berkeley, nearby cities that also have soft story retrofit 
programs. Another area of study would be to survey those who did not retrofit their buildings in 
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